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ARTICLE

SYNERGIZING GOVERNMENT SERVICES
WITH AN INVESTMENT GRIEVANCE
MECHANISM
DONGWOOK CHUN*

I. INTRODUCTION
Recent research from the World Bank Group shows that in twenty
years, approximately twenty-five percent of investors divested from developing countries because of irregular government conduct.1 This divestment
not only exposes host governments to investment and job loss, but it also
causes reputational damage and poses tremendous litigation and arbitration
costs.2 Therefore, it is critical that governments provide a mechanism to
identify and resolve investor grievances in the early stage before investors
leave or their grievances escalate into legal disputes. This mechanism, often
called Investment Grievance Mechanism (IGM)3 by the World Bank Group,
would not only help the government manage grievances in a timely manner,
but also help investors continue and expand businesses by ensuring a more
transparent and consistent investment climate.
* Director in the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (South Korea); Senior Private
Sector Specialist in the Investment Policy and Promotion Team (World Bank Group); J.S.D 2017,
Cornell Law School; LL.M. 2010, Cornell Law School; B.S.E. 2002, Seoul National University;
Member of Bar in California and Washington D.C. Special thanks to World Bank colleagues,
Christine Zhenwei Qiang, Roberto Echandi, Ivan Anton Nimac, Priyanka Kher, and Professor
Mariana Gonstead. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official
policy or position of the Korean Government or the World Bank Group.
1. Roberto Echandi, Ivan Anton Nimac & Dongwook Chun, Retention and Expansion of
Foreign Direct Investment (Vol. 2): Political Risk and Policy Responses, WORLD BANK GROUP, at
IX (2019), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/387801576142339003/Political-Risk-andPolicy-Responses.
2. The costs for an Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) is known to be an average of
$3 million in administrative costs and $10.4 million in damages per arbitration case. Susan D.
Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1,
57–58 (2007).
3. It is also known as Systematic Investment Response Mechanism (SIRM) depending on
the context.
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The Office of the Korean Foreign Investment Ombudsman4 (OFIO) is
considered to have one of the best global practices of IGM to help current
investors continue and expand their businesses.5 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) reported that Korea’s Foreign Investment
Ombudsman system is an effective way to promote investor confidence.6
Many countries, such as Russia, Kazakhstan, Brazil, and Vietnam, have
shown interest in implementing systems similar to Korea’s Foreign Investment Ombudsman system.7 The purpose of this paper is to explore the institutional and structural management of the OFIO, and to draw lessons from
the successful operation of the Korean model for resolving and preventing
investor-state grievances.
II. GRIEVANCE MECHANISM

FOR

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

The concept of conflict management with respect to investor grievances can be conceptualized as existing on a “conflict continuum” between
“problem” on one hand and a “legal dispute” on the other hand.8 Beginning
on the “problem” side of the conflict continuum, a problem between investors and public agencies can become a grievance if unattended, and can
escalate into a “legal dispute,” which is a focused disagreement framed in
legal terms.9 Given that most countries today have highly regulated environments for doing business, the number of problems that arise everyday
between investors and public agencies can be significant.10 However, not
all problems become grievances, and not all grievances escalate into legal
disputes.11 Most minor problems can easily be resolved by direct interaction
between investors and the respective governmental agencies, but other
problems that remain unresolved can become grievances over time.12 Depending on the persistence of the case and on the severity of the impact
over businesses, such grievances, if they remain unattended, can escalate
into full-blown legal disputes.13
4. Ombudsman is an official or institution mandated to remain impartial while receiving
complaints or questions and to make efforts to resolve conflicts between investors and the State at
an early stage. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Investor-State
Disputes: Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration, UNCTAD SERIES ON INT’L INV. POL’YS FOR
DEV., at xx (2010).
5. WORLD BANK GROUP, INVESTMENT PROTECTION TOOLKIT 125 (2016).
6. Invest Korea, About the Office of the Foreign Investment Ombudsman (OFIO), https://
www.investkorea.org/ik-en/cntnts/i-447/web.do (last visited July 28, 2020).
7. Id.
8. Roberto Echandi, Investor-State Conflict Management: A Preliminary Sketch, TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. J. 1, 7 (2014).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. WORLD BANK GROUP, supra note 5, at 125.
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The World Bank Group suggests a practical solution package called
Investment Grievance Mechanism. IGM is designed to enable governments
to manage conflicts by timely identifying, tracking, and resolving investorstate grievances that put investment projects at risk of divestment.14 IGM
requires the empowerment of a reform-oriented government agency and the
establishment of an intergovernmental mechanism for addressing investorstate grievances arising from government conduct, which thereby reduces
this type of risk at its source.15 This mechanism also collects data on the
source of government-generated risks affecting investments and quantifies
investment that is retained, expanded, or lost as a consequence of addressing or failing to address such risks.16 Figure 1 shows the concept of IGM on
the Investment Conflict Continuum.
FIGURE 1: INVESTMENT CONFLICT CONTINUUM

AND THE SCOPE OF

IGM17

In a recent publication, the World Bank Group suggests several common elements from the implementation of pilot programs:18
• Empowerment of a Lead Agency: There should be a government agency that is responsible for implementing IGM. The
Lead Agency should be empowered from the top political
level and coordinate national, subnational, and sector-specific
agencies that are more likely to be involved in investment
grievances.19
• Creation of an Early Alert and Monitoring Mechanism:
There should be an early alert mechanism that enables the
Lead Agency to learn about the existence of grievances as
early as possible before they become disputes. Once a grievance is identified, the Lead Agency should record the case
profile, such as amount of investment, number of jobs, issues,
14. Priyanka Kher & Dongwook Chun, Policy Options to Mitigate Political Risk and Attract
FDI, WORLD BANK GROUP, at 15 (2020), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/
10986/34380/Policy-Options-to-Mitigate-Political-Risk-and-Attract-FDI.pdf.
15. Id. at 17.
16. WORLD BANK GROUP, supra note 5, at 125.
17. Echandi et al., supra note 1, at 42.
18. Id. at 43.
19. Id. at 50.
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and relevant agencies.20 The Lead Agency should monitor its
progress and when a given case is resolved, it should record
the investment/jobs retained or expanded.21
• Problem Solving Methods: The Lead Agency should use different problem-solving methods to create solutions with the
agencies involved in a problem with investors. These methods
range from simple exchanges of information or direct negotiation to legal advisory opinions.22
• Political Decision Making: If the Lead Agency cannot resolve the case, often the Lead Agency should escalate the
problem to a higher government authority. Once a decision is
taken to a higher level of authority, the Lead Agency should
monitor and track the resolution—positive or negative—and
its impact on investments.23
III. KOREAN MODEL

AS AN

EXAMPLE

OF

GOOD GLOBAL PRACTICE

The Korean Office of the Foreign Investment Ombudsman (OFIO),
which was established in 1999, aims to resolve grievances of foreign-invested companies in Korea.24 The OFIO has successfully operated based on
a strong legal and institutional foundation from the Korea Trade-Investment
Promotion Agency (KOTRA),25 the Korean Investment Promotion Agency
(IPA),26 and governmental empowerment from the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy (MOTIE).27
20. Id. at 51.
21. Id. at 56.
22. Id. at 43.
23. Id.
24. Invest Korea, About the Office of the Foreign Investment Ombudsman (OFIO), https://
www.investkorea.org/ik-en/cntnts/i-447/web.do (last visited July 28, 2020).
25. Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency Act, art. 10 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea
Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_mobile/
ganadaDetail.do?hseq=42757&type=abc&key=KOREA%20TRADEINVESTMENT%20PROMO
TION%20AGENCY%20ACT&param=K (“(1) In order to achieve the purposes referred to in Article 1, KOTRA shall conduct the following projects: . . . 6. Attraction of foreign investment
(including exploitation of overseas resources and energy) and support for overseas investment by
domestic enterprises.”).
26. Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs) are often the public face of governments seeking
to increase investment, promote economic and social development, and are generally instrumental
in negotiating investment treaties and concluding investment contracts; they also manage investment relationships through aftercare services. See World Association of Investment Promotion
Agency, Overview of Investment Promotion: Report of the findings from the WAIPA Annual Survey of 2018, at v (2019), https://waipa.org/waipa-content/uploads/Overview-of-Investment-Promotion-2019.pdf.
27. Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency Act, art. 14 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea
Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_mobile/ganadaDetail.do?hseq=42757&type=abc&key=KOREA%20TRADEINVESTMENT%20PROMOTION
%20AGENCY%20ACT&param=K (“(1) The Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy shall guide
and supervise matters referred to in the following subparagraphs among the business affairs of
KOTRA and affairs related to such matters: . . . 1. Projects implemented by KOTRA pursuant to
Article 10; 2. Projects entrusted by the Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy. (2) The Minister
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A. Institutional Evolution28
Since its establishment in 1991, the OFIO has expanded its organization and operation. At first, MOTIE established the Office of the Foreign
Investment Consultation in June 1991.29 This unit was restructured and
renamed as the Office of the Foreign Investment Grievance Consultation
under MOTIE in April 1996.30 In July 1998, the function of the Office of
the Foreign Investment Grievance Consultation was transferred to the
newly established Investment Aftercare Team under KOTRA.31 Also, the
Korean government legally established the OFIO and the Minister of MOTIE appointed the Ombudsman, the head of the OFIO.32 In March 2001, an
important law was amended that supported the political underpinning of the
OFIO by enabling the President of Korea to appoint the Ombudsman.33
Afterwards, the OFIO strengthened its organization and capacity by merging with the Investment Aftercare Team in 2015.34
B. Legal Foundation
As a result of this evolution, the current institutional setup has four
core elements: the Ombudsman, Home Doctors, the Investment Consulting
Center, and the Foreign Investment Committee. First, the Ombudsman is
the head of the OFIO who is directly appointed by the President of the
Republic of Korea.35 Second, the OFIO operates Home Doctors that specialize in various fields—including finance, accounting, law, industrial
sites, and taxation—to provide clients with one-on-one service by investigating and resolving a wide range of grievances.36 Third, KOTRA has an
Investment Consulting Center comprised of public officials serving as
secondees from several ministries and municipal governments.37 The Investment Consulting Center works with the OFIO to bring relevant grievof Trade, Industry and Energy may have KOTRA submit reports and materials to the minimum
extent necessary for the formulation of trading policies.”).
28. See Invest Korea, supra note 24.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Invest Korea, supra note 24.
35. Korea Foreign Investment Promotion Act, art. 15-2(2) (S. Kor.), translated in Korea
Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?
hseq=44628&lang=ENG; see also Annex 1.
36. Presidential Decree for Investment Promotion Act, art. 21-4(5) (S. Kor.), translated in
Korea Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/law
View.do?hseq=44628&lang=ENG; see also Annex 1.
37. For example, there are secondees from Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy, Ministry
of Strategy and Finance, Ministry of Government Legislation, Ministry of Employment and Labor, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport, Ministry of Justice,
National Tax Service, local governments, and related organizations. See Investment Consulting
Center, INVEST KOR., http://www.investkorea.org/en/ik/icc.do.
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ance cases to various ministries and to coordinate possible resolutions.38
Lastly, the OFIO works with the Foreign Investment Committee that serves
as a platform for government officials to discuss policy issues or investor
grievances in higher governmental levels.39 The Foreign Investment Committee is chaired by the Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy, and is
comprised of vice-minister-level officials from other ministries.40
These elements are reflected in two legal instruments: the Foreign Investment Promotion Act and the Presidential Decree for Investment Promotion Act.41 Table 1 shows a brief structure of the legal instruments and
Annex 1 describes a full structure of the laws.

38. Choong Yong Ahn, New Direction of Korea’s Foreign Direct Investment Policy in the
Multi-Track FTA Era: Inducement and Aftercare Services, ORG. ECON. DEV. 2, 12 (2008), https://
www.oecd.org/investment/globalforum/40400795.pdf.
39. Korea Foreign Investment Promotion Act, art. 15-2(6) (S. Kor.), translated in Korea
Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?
hseq=44628&lang=ENG; see also Annex 1.
40. See id. art. 27(2).
41. Korea Foreign Investment Promotion Act was first introduced on January 21, 1999, with
the purpose of promoting foreign investment in Korea by providing necessary support and benefit
and contributing to the sound development of the nation’s economy (Article 1). The Act regulates
OFIO from Article 15 to Article 27.
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KOREA OMBUDSMAN42

Subcategory

Law

Regulation

Purpose

15-2(1) 21-3(1)

Empowerment and
Duties

15-2(2) 21-3(2)

Structure

15-2(10) 21-4(2)

Workflow

N/A

21-4(5)

Delegation

N/A

21-4(8)

Scope

27(1)

34(3)

Structure

27(2)

34(7)

Working
Committee

27(3)

35(1)

Request

15-2(3) 21-3(3)

Coordination

15-2(3) 21-4(3)

Contents
RecomTimeline
mendation
Verification

15-2(4) 21-3(4)

Escalation

Escalation

15-2(6) N/A

Tracking

Analysis

N/A

Report

Annual report

15-2(7) 21-3(7)

Confidentiality

Confidentiality

15-2(8),
N/A
24(3)

Others

Others

15-2(9) 21-4(6)

15-2(5) 21-3(5)
N/A

21-6(6)
21-4(7)

C. Grievance Resolution Process
The Foreign Investment Promotion Act and the Presidential Decree for
Investment Promotion Act enable the OFIO to use many techniques to solve
problems between investors and agencies, such as information sharing, direct negotiation, and recommendation.43 When available, the OFIO can use
42. Korean Law Translation Center provides unofficial English translation of the Investment
Promotion Act and Presidential Decree; translated version is available at https://elaw.klri.re.kr/
kor_service/lawView.do?hseq=49546&lang=ENG (last visited July 28, 2020).
43. Korea Foreign Investment Promotion Act, art. 15-2(3)–(4) (S. Kor.), translated in Korea
Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?
hseq=44628&lang=ENG; see also Annex 1.
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the Foreign Investment Committee as an escalation body.44 The former
Ombudsman, Dr. Choong Yong Ahn, explained the resolution process as
follows:
The resolution process takes many forms. Generally, senior consultants, better known as Home Doctors, play a major role in the
decision-making process. In the first stage, senior consultants do
intake and evaluation in order to determine how a case should be
processed. Then, they consult with representatives from relevant
government agencies. After a case is reviewed and opinions exchanged between the Home Doctors and the Ombudsman, senior
consultants submit a grievance resolution proposal through official channels. In the event that a case is rejected, the matter can be
brought before the Foreign Investment Working Committee, the
Regulatory Reform Committee, and/or the Office for Government
Policy Coordination.45
The OFIO categorizes grievance cases into three groups based on the
grievance process: Home Doctor Resolution, Administrative Intervention,
and Legislative Improvement. An OFIO Annual Report from 2018 describes these three groups as follows:
Home Doctor Resolution means problems solved internally by
Home Doctors, often through consultations. On the other hand,
Administrative Intervention means that government takes steps to
make improvements within an existing legal framework. And,
Legislative Improvement refers to regulatory reforms and/or
change in laws.46
As can be seen in the data from Table 2, most of the cases registered to the
OFIO are resolved by Home Doctors. Home Doctors are persons that directly contact investors and specialists in certain areas to review cases.47
Home Doctors can address and resolve grievances through direct consultation or information sharing.48 When they need to ask for more involvement
by government bodies, they can work with government officials in the Investment Consulting Center, who are seconded from different central or
local governments.49 Administrative Intervention is the process by which a
44. See id. art. 15-2(6).
45. Ahn, supra note 38, at 12.
46. Foreign Investment Ombudsman Annual Report 2018, KOREA TRADE-INVESTMENT PROMOTION AGENCY (KOTRA) 1, 43 (Apr. 2019), https://news.kotra.or.kr/user/reports/kotranews/20/
usrReportsView.do?reportsIdx=10545.
47. Ahn, supra note 38, at 12; Korea Foreign Investment Promotion Act, art. 15-2(3) and
Presidential Decree for Investment Promotion Act 21-3(3) (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/kor_service/law
View.do?hseq=49546&lang=ENG; see also Annex 1.
48. Ahn, supra note 38, at 12; Korea Foreign Investment Promotion Act, art. 15-2(3) (Cooperation) and 15-2(4) (Recommendation) (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/kor_service/lawView.do?hseq=49546&lang=ENG;
see also Annex 1.
49. Ahn, supra note 38, at 12.
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case is resolved through active involvement or coordination by the government agency, not necessarily by amending legal instruments or reform actions.50 When grievances are caused by legal instruments, and government
officials do not have discretion to resolve them, the OFIO seeks to amend
the legal instruments, which is counted as Legislative Improvement.51
D. Cases
In 2018, the OFIO handled a total of 269 grievances from foreigninvested companies.52 Table 2 provides the cases involving the OFIO from
2014 to 2018 and is organized according to resolution type.
TABLE 2 GRIEVANCE CASES BASED

ON

RESOLUTION TYPE53

Year Legislative
Improvement

Administrative
Intervention

Home Doctor
Resolution

Total

2014 9 (2.1%)

112 (25.6%)

316 (72.3%)

437 (100%)

2015 14 (3.0%)

112 (24.2%)

336 (72.7%)

462 (100%)

2016 16 (3.9%)

106 (25.9%)

287 (70.2%)

409 (100%)

2017 12 (4.2%)

90 (31.1%)

187 (64.7%)

289 (100%)

2018 6 (2.2%)

108 (40.1%)

155 (57.6%)

269 (100%)

In 2018, grievances related to labor/human resources were submitted
to the OFIO the most, followed by visa/immigration, investment incentives,
investment procedure, and standards/certification/inspection.54 These five
grievance areas accounted for almost fifty percent of all grievances. Grievances related to labor/human resources and investment incentives accounted
for a large share due to an increase in the minimum wage and the abolition
of tax exemptions in 2018.55 Table 3 shows the number of cases by grievance areas that the OFIO managed in 2018.

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Foreign Investment Ombudsman Annual Report 2018, supra note 46, at 43.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Other grievance types were not included in Table 3.
Foreign Investment Ombudsman Annual Report 2018, supra note 46, at 43.
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Field

Case

Ratio (%)

Labor Relations

35

13.0

Visa/Immigration

34

12.6

Investment Incentives

25

9.3

Investment Procedures

20

7.4

Standards, Certification, and Inspection

20

7.4

Finance & Foreign Exchanges

19

7.1

E. Impact
The OFIO uses reinvestment as a key impact indicator.57 This is based
on the notion that it is important to achieve development benefits by reaching existing investors that have already established a presence in the country,58 as the OFIO’s key mandate is to encourage investment expansion by
ensuring investors’ long and deep engagement in Korea.59
Methodology to calculate total reinvestment is very straightforward: it
is defined as the investment by already-registered investors, or the followup investment after initial (first) investment.60 The amount of reinvestment
(notification basis)61 in 2018 recorded $14 billion and increased by 69.5
percent from the previous year.62 As a result, the share of reinvestment ratio
in 2018 increased to 52.1 percent from 36.1 percent in 2017. From 2001 to
2016, the amount of reinvestment has gradually increased.63

56. Id.
57. According to the “Act on the Management of Public Institutions,” OFIO and its mother
organization, Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA), is required to set a target
impact indicator and monitor the annual performance. Since 2014, they set the amount of Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) and reinvestment as their key performance index.
58. World Bank Group, Investment Policy and Promotion Diagnostics and Tools: Maximizing the Potential Benefits of Foreign Direct Investment for Competitiveness and Development, at
26 (July 13, 2017), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28281.
59. Id.
60. Foreign Investment Ombudsman Annual Report 2018, supra note 46, at 46.
61. The Korean Government uses two types of statistics based on notification basis and received basis. Notification basis is the amount that is calculated based on the investors’ notification
when they register in the process of investment, and received basis is the amount that is actually
invested or implemented. Invest Korea Annual Report 2015, KOTRA 2, https://news.kotra.or.kr/
user/reports/kotranews/20/usrReportsView.do?reportsIdx=6612.
62. Foreign Investment Ombudsman Annual Report 2018, supra note 46, at 46.
63. Id. at 47.
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KOREA64

KOREAN MODEL

Since 1991, the institutional change and successful operation of the
OFIO can be summarized as a path that synergizes various government services, including aftercare,65 ombudsman, and Public-Private Dialogue
(PPD).66
A. IGM + Aftercare
The successful operation of the OFIO shows the synergistic effect between IGM and aftercare function. According to the World Bank Group, a
study on global best practices of IGM revealed two patterns.67 The first
pattern features the deployment of aftercare programs, and the second features the enactment of policies that address political risk that causes Investor-State Dispute Settlements (ISDS) rather than investment retention and
expansion.68 As the OFIO is part of an aftercare unit and its purpose is to
promote or facilitate investment, Korea is a good example of the first model
that operates IGM within a well-structured aftercare unit.
Aftercare function, usually a part of IPA, can be very helpful to implement or sometimes complement IGM. IPAs or aftercare may focus on attracting new investors, but it has been argued that aftercare helps establish
long-term relationships with investors and thereby maximizes opportunities
64. Id.
65. The term “aftercare” can be defined here as the range of activities from post-establishment facilitation services to developmental support to retain investment, encourage follow-on investment, and achieve greater local economic impact. U.N. Conference on Trade and
Development, Aftercare: A Core Function in Investment Promotion, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/
IPC/2007/1 (Sept. 2007).
66. PPD is an institutional arrangement that brings together a group of public and private
sector actors with the objective of building trust and bridging gaps that contribute to a more
conducive environment for private sector development. OECD, Promoting Pro-Poor Growth:
Policy Guidance for Donors, DAC GUIDELINES AND REFERENCES SERIES 1, 122 (2007), https://
doi.org/10.1787/9789264024786-13-en.
67. Echandi et al., supra note 1, at XI.
68. Id.
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for investment, reinvestment, and diversification.69 For example, IPAs may
act as a possible reception window for filing grievances.70 And, as part of
their role to advocate for the improvement of the domestic investment climate, IPAs could collaborate with Lead Agencies to share and diffuse information and to advocate the IGM system.71 Further, aftercare units could be
a key institution in following up with investor-state grievances that do not
entail any risk of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) divestments.72 The OFIO
shows that aftercare units can be combined with IGM to support current
investors and promote the retention and expansion of investment.73
B. IGM + Ombudsman
The OFIO also uses the benefits of an Ombudsman to complement
IGM. The word “ombudsman” is Swedish and literally means “representative.”74 At the most fundamental level, an Ombudsman is one who assists
individuals and groups in the resolution of conflicts or concerns.75 The core
value of an Ombudsman is to ensure neutrality, fairness, objectivity, impartiality, and even-handedness.76
In general, the purpose and implementation of IGM is different than
that of an Ombudsman. Even in some countries where a Business
Ombudsman (BO) is trusted to address grievances, the BO works outside of
the government and performs its neutral roles detached from internal government dynamics.77 On the other hand, IGM is by nature intra-governmental and enables a Lead Agency to use the existing government hierarchy to
discipline another government agency’s grievance-generating behavior in a
non-litigious way.78
Although IGM and an Ombudsman are not replaceable, the OFIO
shows that an Ombudsman can strengthen the IGM mechanism. The OFIO
uses the impartiality and independence of the Ombudsman to manage grievances and to advocate for improvements in investment policy, administrative procedures, and laws and regulations.79 The Foreign Investment
Promotion Act contains several legal provisions that ensure the impartiality
69. Id. at IX.
70. Echandi et al., supra note 1, at 61.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Armando Heilbron & Yago Aranda-Larrey, Strengthening Service Delivery of Investment
Promotion Agencies: The Comprehensive Investor Services Framework, WORLD BANK GROUP
(Mar. 17, 2020), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/33498.
74. What Is an Organizational Ombudsman?, INT’L OMBUDSMAN ASSOC. (2020), https://
www.ombudsassociation.org/what-is-an-organizational-ombuds.
75. Id.
76. FINRA, Ombudsman Neutrality, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (2020), https://
www.finra.org/about/office-ombudsman/ombudsman-neutrality.
77. Echandi et al., supra note 1, at 62.
78. Id. at 44.
79. See id. at 91.

\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\17-2\UST205.txt

2021]

unknown

Seq: 13

SYNERGIZING GOVERNMENT SERVICES

3-JUN-21

12:34

309

and independence of an Ombudsman. For example, the Foreign Investment
Ombudsman is commissioned from “among the persons of abundant learning and experience in foreign investment business,”80 which implies that an
Ombudsman should be an expert of business outside of government. And
the same law says that an Ombudsman is defined as not being a public
official or government employee except when he is charged with a criminal
allegation.81 The independence and neutrality of Ombudsmen have also
been highlighted on several occasions in interviews, meetings, and press
releases.82
C. IGM + Public-Private Dialogue
Public-Private Dialogue (PPD) can be tailored to improve the operation of IGM and the investment climate of a country by addressing systemic
grievances. PPD is an institutional arrangement that brings together a group
of public and private sector actors to lay the foundation for a joint problem
analysis and identification of policies and institutional reforms.83 Over time,
PPD can establish consistent and systemic communication between relevant
stakeholders and the government, which can create trust and facilitate the
resolution of systemic issues.84 PPD can also play a preemptive role in
resolving grievances as it can identify public bodies with which investors
tend to encounter grievances.85 As a result, IGM with PPD can unveil patterns of conduct across institutions, identify patterns of re-incidence by institutions or recurrent problems that place FDI at risk, and develop
evidence-based systemic approaches to forge and discuss reform agendas
with different investment stakeholders.86 IGM and PPD can also help
strengthen the capacity of the “offending” institutions to minimize recurrence of grievances and enable “offending” institutions to take defensive
actions to prevent issues from arising.87
80. Korea Foreign Investment Promotion Act, art. 12 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/kor_service/lawView.do?hseq=
49546&lang=ENG; see also Annex 1.
81. Korea Foreign Investment Promotion Act, art. 15(2)-9 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea
Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/kor_service/law
View.do?hseq=49546&lang=ENG; see also Annex 1.
82. See, e.g., Foreign Investment Ombudsman Annual Report 2016, KOREA TRADE-INVESTMENT PROMOTION AGENCY (KOTRA) 1, 39 (Mar. 2017), http://ombudsman.kotra.or.kr/common.
FileDownload.do;jsessionid=ZXeODiAF0L9aTDxkGdYPYOPdsc5ADVRh4TxcA7P0ts
mNh27L9Rh0y7MT95ewrf4f.S168_WAS_servlet_oio2015?file_id=FILE_000000000000369
(“Both the Ombudsman and Home Doctors are building up mutual trust with foreign companies as
a troubleshooter, a main channel of communication and a fair assistant” (emphasis added)).
83. OECD, supra note 66, at 122.
84. Echandi et al., supra note 1, at 44.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 43.
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The OFIO relies on PPD for regulatory reform with the help of the
MOTIE. The OFIO and MOTIE have many ad-hoc PPD platforms, such as
the Regulatory Reform Committee chaired by the President, that discuss
common investor grievances and resolve systemic issues.88 For example,
there were eleven foreign investors’ grievances in 2016 about the Chemicals Control Act (CCA), which resulted in an Economic Ministerial meeting
on a resolution to relieve the burden for registration and supervision that the
CCA placed on companies.89 And the Ombudsman is regularly invited to
represent foreign investors and deliver investors’ grievances as well as policy suggestions. For example, at the Third Ministerial Meetings for Deregulation in 2015, the Korean Government announced that foreign investors
would have more involvement in the regulation making and reviewing process.90 As a result, the OFIO also opened an internet portal for “Regulatory
Information” in 2015 and started providing regulatory information to foreign investors in a transparent way.91 On this website, foreign investors can
access information in English about drafts submitted by the Korean National Assembly and government and can use an online petition channel to
submit opinions on legislative drafts.92
V. CONCLUSION
Conflict management is a very important function for governments to
resolve investors’ grievances in a timely manner. The World Bank Group
proved that IGM can be a useful and low-cost policy to harness the longterm benefits of FDI.93 As a good global practice, Korea’s Ombudsman
model has been effective in helping investors continue and expand their
businesses. The OFIO has evolved and has been successfully maintained
because of the strong foundation of KOTRA, with more than fifty years of
experience, and because of governmental empowerment from MOTIE. The
OFIO also shows the importance of creative customization of different government functions and provides lessons to other counties that may be interested in implementing conflict management and grievance mechanisms.

88. Foreign Investment Ombudsman Annual Report 2018, supra note 46, at 52–62.
89. Korea Ministry of Strategy and Finance in Korea (MOSF) Press release, Feb. 12, 2014.
90. Korea Ministry of Strategy and Finance in Korea (MOSF) Press release, May 08, 2015.
91. Regulatory Information Guide, Foreign Investment Ombudsman, http://
ombudsman.kotra.or.kr/eng/leg/intro.do (last visited July 28, 2020).
92. Id.
93. Echandi et al., supra note 1, at xi.
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FOREIGN INVESTMENT OMBUDSMAN

Legal System in the Republic of Korea
Investment Promotion Act
Presidential Decree for
Sub-Category
(Law)
Investment Promotion Act
15-2(1) In order to resolve
21-3(1) The term of an
complaints from foreign
Ombudsman shall be three
investors and foreign-capital years.
Foreign
invested companies, an
Investment
Ombudsman shall be
Ombudsman
commissioned from among
persons with abundant
knowledge and experience
in foreign investment affairs.
15-2(2) An Ombudsman
21-3(2) An Ombudsman shall
shall be commissioned by
perform the following duties:
the President, recommended 1. Investigation and handling
by the Minister of Trade,
of complaints of foreign
Industry and Energy.
investors and foreign-capital
invested companies,
Empowerment
2. Preparation of policy
and Duties of
measures for improving a
Foreign
foreign investment system
Investment
and recommendation on the
Ombudsman
implementation to the
relevant administrative
agencies, and
3. Other necessary matters for
handling complaints of
foreign investors and foreigncapital invested companies.
15-2(10) A grievance
21-4(2) An Ombudsman shall
committee shall be
be the head of the grievance
established within the Korea committee.
Grievance
Trade-Investment Promotion
Committee
Agency in order to support
the duties of an
Ombudsman.
N/A
21-4(5) In order to efficiently
settle the complaints of
foreign investors and foreigncapital invested companies,
the head of the grievance
Workflow
committee may designate the
staff in exclusive charge of
settling complaints for each
region or foreign-capital
invested company, and may
administer such staff.
N/A
21-4(8) Except as otherwise
expressly provided for in
paragraphs (2), (3), (5), (6)
and (7), matters necessary for
the organization and operation
Delegation
of the grievance committee
shall be determined by the
president of the Korea TradeInvestment Promotion
Agency following
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deliberation by the Foreign
Investment Committee.
27(1) A Foreign Investment 34(3) The president of the
Committee shall be
Korea Trade-Investment
established under the
Promotion Agency, the
Ministry of Trade, Industry foreign investment
and Energy to deliberate on Ombudsmen, and the project
the following: . . . 4. Matters managers may attend the
concerning cooperation
meetings of the Committee
among, and coordination of and state their opinions.
different opinions of public
institutions with respect to
foreign investment.
27(2) The Minister of Trade, 34(7) A secretary shall be
Industry and Energy shall be assigned to the Committee to
the Chairperson of the
handle its administrative
Foreign Investment
affairs, and the secretary shall
Committee.
be appointed by the Minister
of Trade, Industry and Energy
from among public officials
belonging to the Ministry of
Trade, Industry and Energy.
27(3) A Working
35(1) Matters entrusted to a
Committee shall be
Working Committee by the
established to review and
Committee pursuant to
coordinate matters to be
Article 27(3) of the Act are as
deliberated upon by the
follows: . . . 4. Matters
Foreign Investment
regarding the establishment
Committee, and to deliberate and operation of the grievance
on matters entrusted by the committee.
Foreign Investment
Committee, as prescribed by
Presidential Decree.
15-2(3) An Ombudsman
21-3(3) Ombudsman can
may request relevant
request cooperation when;
administrative agency to
1. It is necessary for
render the following
investigating whether a
necessary cooperation.
foreign investment-related
1. Giving explanations
system complies with
and/or submitting data;
international practices or
2. Stating opinions of related standards;
employees, and/or
2. It is necessary for tackling
stakeholders;
difficulties experienced by
3. Requesting cooperation
foreign-capital invested
for site visits.
companies in their
management or improving the
related systems;
3. It is necessary for
improving the living
conditions of foreign
investors and foreigners
working for foreign-capital
invested companies.
15-2(3) The head of a
21-4(3) The agency upon
relevant administrative
receipt of a request for
agency in receipt of such a
cooperation shall present the
request of cooperation shall results of resolving
comply therewith, except in complaints or its opinion on
extenuating circumstances. such matters within seven
days after receipt of the
request.
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15-2(4) An Ombudsman
may recommend the heads
of relevant administrative
agencies to take corrective
measures on related affairs.

Contents

Recommendation

Timeline

15-2(5) Upon receipt of
recommendations made
under paragraph (4), the
heads of relevant
administrative agencies
shall, in writing, notify the
Ombudsman of handling
results.
N/A

Verification

Escalation

Escalation

Tracking

Analysis

Report

Annual report

Monitoring

15-2(6) Where relevant
administrative agencies fail
to implement
recommendations made
under paragraph (4), the
Ombudsman may request
them to submit matters
concerning such
recommendations to the
Foreign Investment
Committee as an agenda.
N/A
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21-3(4) “Recommendation
for corrective measures” shall
be made in a document
specifying the following
matters:
1. Current status and
problems of related statutes,
institutions, and policies;
2. Details of recommendation
for corrective measures;
3. Matters recognized by an
Ombudsman as being
necessary, such as the reply
deadline for related
administrative agencies and
public agencies.
21-3(5) Relevant agencies
shall, in writing, notify
Ombudsmen within 30 days
after receipt of a
recommendation.

21-6(6) An Ombudsman may
verify and inspect the
performance of the details of
recommendations for
corrective measures.
N/A

21-4(7) The head of the
Grievance Committee shall
analyze the results of settling
complaints raised by foreigncapital invested companies on
a quarterly basis and report
them to the Minister of Trade,
Industry and Energy within
one month after expiration of
each quarter.
15-2(7) The Ombudsman
21-3(7) An Ombudsman shall
shall prepare an annual
prepare an annual report and
report on reorganization
submit it to the Foreign
activities, such as the current Investment Committee by the
status of regulations and
end of February of the
systems obstructing foreign following year;
investment, results of
1. Current status of the
improvement thereof, etc.,
regulations and systems raised
and submit the report to the as grievances by foreign
Foreign Investment
investors and foreign-capital
Committee.
invested companies;
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Confidentiality
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Others

Others

15-2(8) No Ombudsman
shall use data received from
the heads of relevant
administrative agencies, etc.
pursuant to paragraph (3) or
confidential information that
they have become aware of
in the course of performing
duties for any purposes other
than those prescribed by this
Act, or divulge it to any third
party.
24(3) No public officials
who collect and compile
data and statistics on foreign
investment pursuant to
Article 24 (1) and (2) shall
divulge any trade secret of
the relevant companies.
15-2(9) The Ombudsman
shall be deemed a public
official for the purposes of
penal provisions under
Articles 129 through 132 of
the Criminal Act.
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2. Results of improvement of
the regulations and systems
by the Ombudsman in the
previous year;
3. Other matters concerning
supportive activities to tackle
grievances of foreign
investors and foreign-capital
invested companies.
N/A

N/A

21-4(6) Where an employee
belonging to the Grievance
Committee hears opinions or
visits a site under Article 152(3) of the Act to support the
duties of the Ombudsman,
he/she shall carry a certificate
of identification indicating
his/her authority and produce
it to interested persons.

